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I
INTRODUCTION

In the beginning there were only paper subdivisions. In the nineteenth
century and well into the third decade of this century, land could be
subdivided without constructing the public improvements that would be
needed to serve the subdivided land. The subdivider needed only to prepare
an accurate plat of the property to be subdivided, usually with the assistance
of a surveyor, and then record it in the appropriate county office. The
subdivider did not assume responsibility for constructing any of the
subdivision improvements. That task was left to the municipality or to the
purchasers of lots in the subdivision. Streets were laid out but, in many
instances, title to the street did not pass to the municipality unless it improved
the street or actual use of the street had already commenced. 1
The practice of recording subdivision plats without making any provision
for the construction of public improvements produced two undesirable
results. First, the premature subdivision of land created an oversupply of
subdivided lots. Lacking purchasers, many paper subdivisions were only
partially improved or never improved at all, and they became "dead land"
that impeded the normal and orderly growth of municipalities. As a
consequence, new residential developments leapfrogged over such areas of
dead land into unsubdivided lands lying beyond the old, moribund
subdivisions. Moreover, because they remained vacant, tax delinquencies
became chronic and widespread in these unimproved dead subdivisions, a
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condition that further discouraged and frustrated attempts to develop the
2
land.
Second, in addition to ad valorem tax delinquencies, the depression of the
early 1930's caused widespread delinquencies in payment of special
assessments that had, in some instances, been levied to construct the physical
improvements in platted subdivisions. The incentive to pay such special
assessments existed only when the assessed lot had been improved by
construction of a residence. Special assessment liens were foreclosed, but
only a fraction of the assessments due were realized upon foreclosure because
of the general depreciation in land values. As a result, the municipalities that
had levied the assessments did not have sufficient funds to pay either the
principal or the interest on special assessment bonds as they became due,
there were widespread defaults on those bonds, and some bondholders
suffered heavy losses. Special assessment bonds became suspect investments,
and it became increasingly difficult for municipalities to find a market for
these bonds or to persuade contractors to accept them as payment for the
construction of subdivision improvements.3 Not wishing to recreate the
unhappy experience of the early 1930's, more and more cities sought to solve
the problem by securing the construction of physical improvements in
subdivisions. Many cities began requiring subdividers to become land
developers. They required the developer either to construct improvements at
his own expense, or post a bond or other financial guarantee with the
municipality, the proceeds of which could be used to construct improvements
4
that the subdivider failed to provide.
By 1958, the mandatory construction of subdivision improvements as a
condition of subdivision plat approval had become the dominant method of
securing such improvements. In that year, a survey conducted by the
International City Managers Association of 880 cities with populations of over
10,000 revealed that 692 of the cities surveyed had subdivision regulations.
Six hundred fifteen of those cities imposing regulations required the
subdivider to install one or more types of physical improvements in the
5
subdivisions they were platting.
2. INSTALLATION OF PHYSICAL IMPROVEMENTS, supra note 1, at 1-2; Aschman, Dead Land:
Chronically Tax Delinquent Lands in Cook County, 20 LAND ECON. 40 (1946); Crane, Jr., Subdivision
Regulation in Unincorporated Areas, 22 PROC. NAT'L PLAN. CONF. 15 (1930); Note, An Analysis of
Subdivision Control Legislation, 28 IND. L.J. 544, 545-46 (1952).
3. Bryant, Special Assessments and Special Taxing Districts, 1952 A.B.A. SEC. MUN. L. REP. 29. The
substantial discounts imposed by banks to which contractors attempted to sell the bonds made
construction of public improvements by special assessment more costly because contractors took the
prospective discount into account in submitting'bids.
4. INSTALLATION OF PHYSICAL IMPROVEMENTS, supra note 1, at 1-2; Mills, supra note 1, at 65.
5. INTERNATIONAL CITY MANAGERS ASS'N, MUNICIPAL YEARBOOK 253-60 (1958); see also TENN.
STATE PLANNING COMM'N, PUB. No. 282, SUBDIVISION IMPROVEMENT COSTS: WHO PAYS FOR WHAT 920 (1958); URBAN LAND INST., TECHNICAL BULL. No. 27, UTILITIES AND FACILITIES FOR NEW
RESIDENTIAL DEVELOPMENT 11 (1955). For a contemporary description of subdivision improvement
requirements, procedures, and financial guarantees, see Schultz & Kelley, Subdivision Improvement
Requirements and Guarantees: A Primer, 28J. URB. & CONTEMP. L. 3 (1985).
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II
COMPULSORY SUBDIVISION IMPROVEMENTS

A.

On-Site Improvements

As one would expect, the real estate community was initially reluctant to
recognize either the wisdom or the constitutionality of conditioning
subdivision plat approval on the installation of public improvements in the
subdivision. Most courts, however, did not share the real estate community's
sense of outrage at this burden, and such requirements were virtually
uniformly upheld. An early Michigan decision upheld the compulsory
dedication of land for subdivision streets. 6 The New York Court of Appeals
rejected the claim that mandatory street dedications and improvements
7
constituted a taking of private property for public use without compensation.
In a short period of time, numerous courts sustained requirements for the
construction of various public improvements on subdivision rights of way
2
such as sewers, 8 watermains, 9 sidewalks, l0 curbs and gutters,' I storm drains,'
and even landscaping.13
There have been, however, occasional setbacks. A NewJersey court struck
down a portion of an ordinance requiring construction of off-site watermains
because no standards existed for determining whether the watermains were in
fact needed by the development in question. 14 The same decision, however,
recognized the general authority of municipalities to require on-site
watermains. '

B.

5

Off-Site Improvements

Having waged successful combat over the question of installation of onsite subdivision improvements, municipalities turned their attention to an
additional, more difficult objective: requiring the subdivider to finance the
construction of off-site improvements. This requirement actually includes
two somewhat different types of regulations. One is a requirement that the
subdivider construct improvements not on land in the subdivision itself, but
6. Ridgefield Land Co. v. Detroit, 241 Mich. 468, 217 N.W. 58 (1928).
7. Brous v. Smith, 304 N.Y. 164, 106 N.E.2d 503 (1952).
8. E.g., Mefford v. City of Tulare, 102 Cal. App. 2d 919, 228 P.2d 847 (1951); City of
Bellefontaine Neighbors v. J.J. Kelly Realty & Bldg. Co., 460 S.W.2d 298 (Mo. Ct. App. 1970);
Medine v. Burns, 29 Misc. 2d 890, 208 N.Y.S.2d 12 (Sup. Ct. 1960).
9. E.g., Crownhill Homes, Inc. v. City of San Antonio, 433 S.W.2d 448 (Tex. Ct. Civ. App.
1968); Zastrow v. Village of Brown Deer, 9 Wis. 2d 100, 100 N.W.2d 359 (1960).
10. E.g., Allen v. Stockwell, 210 Mich. 488, 178 N.W. 27 (1920); City of Bellefontaine Neighbors
v. J.J. Kelly Realty & Bldg. Co., 460 S.W.2d 298 (Mo. Ct. App. 1970).
11. E.g., Petterson v. City of Naperville, 9 111. 2d 233, 137 N.E.2d 371 (1956).
12. E.g., Delight, Inc. v. Baltimore County, 475 F. Supp. 754 (D. Md. 1979), aff'd, 624 F.2d 12
(4th Cir. 1980).
13. E.g., Mac-Rich Realty Constr., Inc. v. Planning Bd., 4 Mass. App. Ct. 79, 341 N.E.2d 916
(1976).
14. Lake Intervale Homes, Inc. v. Township of Parsippany-Troy Hills, 28 N.J. 423, 442, 147
A.2d 28, 39 (1958).
15. Id.
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rather on land bordering on the edge of the subdivision, crossing it, or
extending out from it. The other type of regulation, usually issued with
respect to storm drains or water and sewer mains, requires that lines in the
subdivision or those extending out from it contain sufficient excess capacity to
serve other developments.
Municipalities have had more mixed success with mandatory off-site
improvement requirements than with on-site improvement requirements.
The California Supreme Court was one of the first courts to consider this
issue in Ayres v. City Council, 16 often considered the seminal case supporting
mandatory street-dedication requirements. The real importance of Ayres,
however, is not that it approved mandatory on-site dedications, but that it
upheld a regulation requiring dedication of an additional right of way along
an existing public street bordering on the subdivision. The approval of such a
regulation is significant because it was questionable whether dedication of the
additional right of way fulfilled a need created by the subdivision. 17 Thus, the
court approved a classic off-site requirement. Similarly, in Hudson Oil Co. v.
City of Wichita, 18 the Kansas Supreme Court upheld a municipal land
dedication requirement. In order to receive approval of a rezoning
application, the developer was required to dedicate an additional right of way
that was designed to provide sufficient space for construction of a frontage
road in order to prevent individual driveway access to an arterial street. The
court felt that the requirement was "necessary to maintain uniformity in a
service or frontage street .... 19

Not all challenges to mandatory off-site improvement requirements have
failed. For example, the Michigan Supreme Court held that Livingston
County did not have the authority to require a developer to improve an offsite road by removing a hill and regrading the road. 20 In addition, the
Virginia Supreme Court held that Fairfax County officials could not require a
developer to pay the cost of reconstructing parts of two state secondary roads
abutting the proposed development. 2' In NewJersey, the state supreme court
required a municipality to reimburse a developer who had contributed to the
cost of an off-site drainage facility in order to receive subdivision approval,
even though the drainage facility was constructed as a general improvement
and no part of the cost was allocated to other properties that were specially
benefited. 22 Recently, the Alabama Supreme Court held that the authority of
16. 34 Cal. 2d 31, 207 P.2d 1 (1949).
17. Id. at 31, 207 P.2d at 1.
18. 193 Kan. 623, 396 P.2d 271 (1964).
19. Id. at 629, 396 P.2d at 275.
20. Arrowhead Dev. Co. v. Livingston County Rd. Comm'n, 413 Mich. 505, 322 N.W.2d 702
(1982).
21. Hylton Enters. v. Board of Supervisors, 220 Va. 435, 258 S.E.2d 577 (1979). The Virginia
Supreme Court has recently distinguished the Hylton decision in County Supervisors v. Sie-Gray
Developers, Inc., 230 Va. 24, 334 S.E.2d 542 (1985). In Sie-Gray, the court held that a developer's
voluntary agreement to make off-site improvements is enforceable. A dissenting opinion questioned
just how "voluntary" the agreement was in the context of the usual development permission process.
Id. at -, 334 S.E.2d at 548 (Russell, J., dissenting).
22. Divan Builders, Inc. v. Planning Bd., 66 N.J. 582, 334 A.2d 30 (1975).
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the city of Mobile over subdivisions did not permit it to require that a
developer reserve a 100-foot wide strip of land outside a proposed
23
subdivision for a future thoroughfare.
Other courts have adopted a middle-of-the-road approach to the question
of off-site improvements. The New Hampshire Supreme Court has held that a
developer can be required to improve off-site roads providing access to the
development, but only to the extent of the developer's fair share of the
costs. 24 If those roads would serve needs beyond those generated by the
subdivision, the municipality must share the cost. 25 A second alternative is

commonly called a "recapture agreement." These agreements, usually
embodied in municipal ordinances, require the developer to advance the full
amount of the construction and installation costs required to make the public
improvements.2 6 Those costs, however, are subsequently apportioned among
the various properties that benefit from the improvements. Through
subdivision and tap-on fees, the municipality secures from subsequent
developers the portion of the cost not attributable to the initial development.
It then refunds those sums with interest to the developer that advanced the
funds for construction of the improvements. 27 Recapture agreements are
typically recorded on county title records so that subsequent purchasers of
land subject to recapture payments will take title with knowledge of the
obligation.
III
CHALLENGES TO SUBDIVISION EXACTIONS

Challenges to subdivision exactions have centered on three principal
objections: (1) that a subdivision exaction is an ultra vires requirement, that
is, the municipality lacks the statutory authority to impose such an exaction;
(2) that the subdivision exaction is unreasonable because it is unrelated to the
provision of an improvement needed by the subdivision itself; and (3) that
some municipalities' practice of requiring cash payments in lieu of land
dedication is unauthorized or is, in fact, an impermissible form of taxation.
Each of these objections will be examined in turn.
23. Arnett v. City of Mobile, 449 So. 2d 1222 (Ala. 1984).
24. Land/Vest Properties, Inc. v. Town of Plainfield, 117 N.H. 817, 379 A.2d 200 (1977). A
similar approach to apportioning the cost of removing an off-site ledge that obstructed vision on a
nearby road was taken inJ.E.D. Assocs. v. Town of Atkinson, 121 N.H. 581, 432 A.2d 12 (1981).
25. 117 N.H. at 822, 379 A.2d at 203.
26. See, e.g., ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 24, paras. 9-5-1 to 9-5-3 (1983).
Courts in numerous jurisdictions that have not adopted legislation similar to the Illinois
legislation have held, however, that municipal ordinances containing recapture agreements are void
as beyond the scope of the general state enabling statute. See, e.g., Kelber v. City of Upland, 155 Cal.
App. 2d 631, 318 P.2d 561 (1957); Rosen v. Village of Downers Grove, 19 I11. 2d 448, 167 N.E.2d
230 (1960); Coronado Dev. Co. v. City of McPherson, 189 Kan. 174, 368 P.2d 51 (1962); Ridgemont
Dev. Co. v. City of E. Detroit, 358 Mich. 387, 100 N.W.2d 301 (1960).
27. See, e.g., ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 24, para. 9-5-2 (1983).
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The Ultra Vires Objection

Absent free-wheeling home rule authority, express or implied statutory
authority is crucial to the validity of an exaction. Ordinarily, whether there is
specific statutory authority for a challenged requirement does not pose a
significant problem. For example, in Aunt Hack Ridge Estates v. Planning
Commission, 28 the Connecticut Supreme Court rejected a subdivider's claim
that a state statute prohibited a park dedication requirement in an eleven-lot
subdivision of the lesser of 10,000 square feet or four percent of the
subdivided area. 29 The statute authorized promulgation of subdivision
regulations that would enable the Planning Commission to "provide open
spaces for parks and playgrounds when, and in places, deemed proper by the
Planning Commission, which open spaces for parks and playgrounds shall be
30
shown on the subdivision plan."
In some instances, however, courts have rejected a statutory interpretation
that would authorize subdivision requirements. For example, the Illinois
Supreme Court has held that a statute authorizing municipalities to establish
reasonable standards of subdivision design including, among other things,
school grounds, did not authorize a municipal ordinance requiring the
dedication of land for educational purposes. 3 1 In Kelber v. City of Upland,32 a
California court held that a municipality had exceeded its authority by
requiring payment into a general park and school fund that benefited the
entire city as a condition of subdivision approval. Subsequently, however, the
33
California Supreme Court, in Associated Home Builders v. City of Walnut Creek,
held that later statutory amendments had conferred the necessary authority
missing in the Kelber decision.
There is a similar history in both Texas and Florida. A Texas court
originally held that there existed no statutory authority for Texas
municipalities to require dedication of park land as a condition of subdivision
approval. 34 Four years later, the Texas Supreme Court restricted the earlier
holding to the specific facts of the case, and concluded that, in general, Texas
municipalities could require the dedication of park lands. 35 Similarly, the
precedential value of an early Florida decision holding that cash payments
may not be exacted as a part of the subdivision approval process 36 has been
37
considerably impaired by subsequent Florida decisions in impact fee cases.
28. 160 Conn. 109, 273 A.2d 880 (1970).
29. Id. at 111, 273 A.2d at 882; see also Billings Properties, Inc. v. Yellowstone County, 144
Mont. 25, 394 P.2d 182 (1964); Jenad, Inc. v. Village of Scarsdale, 18 N.Y.2d 78, 218 N.E.2d 673,
271 N.Y.S.2d 955 (1966).
30. 160 Conn. at 111, 273 A.2d at 883.
31. Rosen v. Village of Downers Grove, 19 Il1. 2d 448, 167 N.E.2d 230 (1960).
32. 155 Cal. App. 2d 631, 318 P.2d 561 (1957).
33. 4 Cal. 3d 633, 484 P.2d 606, 94 Cal. Rptr. 630, appeal dismissed, 404 U.S. 878 (1971).
34. Berg Dev. Co. v. City of Missouri City, 603 S.W.2d 273 (Tex. Ct. Civ. App. 1980).
35. City of College Station v. Turtle Rock Corp., 680 S.W.2d 802 (Tex. 1984).
36. Admiral Dev. Corp. v. City of Maitland, 267 So. 2d 860 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1972).
37. See, e.g., Hollywood, Inc. v. Broward County, 431 So. 2d 606 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1983);
Broward County v. Janis Dev. Corp., 311 So. 2d 371 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1975).
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The Reasonableness Tests

The constitutionality of state laws authorizing local governments to
require land dedication as a condition of subdivision approval have been
uniformly upheld against challenges that they deprive the property owner of
due process. 3 In general, the rationale for these decisions is that the state
laws are reasonably related to the achievement of legitimate governmental
objectives founded in the public welfare and are therefore within the police
39 "
power of the state.
The principal constitutional dispute has revolved around the question
whether there is a reasonable relationship between the exaction requirement
and achievement of a proper public purpose. Specifically, the battle has been
conducted over whether there must be a direct and demonstrable relationship
between the exaction and the needs of the subdivision development, or
whether a looser standard would suffice. Most jurisdictions have opted for the
looser standard that there be a rational or reasonable relationship between
40
the exaction and needs created by the development.
In Collis v. City of Bloomington,4 1 the Minnesota Supreme Court explained
the rationale for its approval of that state's version of the reasonable
relationship test:
While in general subdivision regulations are a valid exercise of the police power, made
necessary by the problems subdivisions create-i.e., greater needs for municipal
services and facilities -the possibility of arbitrariness and unfairness in their
application is nonetheless substantial: A municipality could use dedication regulations
to exact land or fees from a subdivider far out of proportion to the needs created by
this subdivision in order to avoid imposing the burden of paying for additional
services on all citizens via taxation. To tolerate this situation would be to allow an
otherwise acceptable exercise of police power to become grand theft. But the
enabling statute here prevents this from occurring by authorizing dedication of only a
,reasonable portion' of land for the purposes stated. We therefore uphold the statute
as constitutional. A 'reasonable portion' is construed to mean that portion of land
which the evidence reasonably establishes the municipality will need to acquire for the
purposes stated as a result of approval of the subdivision. This is, of necessity, a factsand-circumstances test, but it is the only kind of test that will consider the myriad of
factors which may bear on a municipality's needs for certain
kinds of facilities and the
42
relationship of a particular subdivision to those needs.

38.

For a more extended discussion of the constitutional issue, see Hagman, Exactions, User Fees

and Assessments: What Are the Limits?, in ZONING AND PLANNING LAW HANDBOOK 45 (F. Strom ed. 1983);
Heyman & Gilhool, The Constitutionalityof Imposing Increasing Community Costs on New Suburban Residents
through Subdivision Exactions, 73 YALE L.J. 1119 (1964); Johnston, Constitutionalityof Subdivision Control
Exactions: The Questfor a Rationale, 52 CORNELL L.Q. 871 (1962).

39. Associated Home Builders v. City of Walnut Creek, 4 Cal. 3d 633, 484 P.2d 606, 94 Cal.
Rptr. 630, appeal dismissed, 404 U.S. 878 (1971); Aunt Hack Ridge Estates, Inc. v. Planning Comm'n,
160 Conn. 109, 273 A.2d 880 (1970); Billings Properties, Inc. v. Yellowstone County, 144 Mont. 25,
394 P.2d 182 (1964);Jenad, Inc. v. Village of Scarsdale, 18 N.Y.2d 78, 218 N.E.2d 673, 271 N.Y.S.2d
955 (1966); Frank Ansuini, Inc. v. Cranston, 107 R.I. 63, 264 A.2d 910 (1970).
40. See, e.g., Home Builders Ass'n v. City of Kansas City, 555 S.W.2d 832 (Mo. 1977);Jenad, Inc.
v. Village of Scarsdale, 18 N.Y.2d 78, 218 N.E.2d 673, 271 N.Y.S.2d 955 (1966); Call v. City of W.
Jordan, 606 P.2d 217, 220 (Utah 1979);Jordan v. Village of Menomonee Falls, 28 Wis. 2d 608, 137
N.W.2d 442 (1965), appeal dismissed, 385 U.S. 4 (1966).
41. 310 Minn. 5, 246 N.W.2d 19 (1976).
42. Id. at 17, 246 N.W.2d at 26.
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The California Supreme Court's Walnut Creek decision 4 3 provides the leading
explanation of the rationale behind the reasonable relationship test. The
court said:
We see no persuasive reason in the face of these urgent needs caused by present and
anticipated future population growth on the one hand and the disappearance of open
land on the other to hold that a statute requiring the dedication of land by a
subdivider may be justified only upon the ground that the particular subdivider upon
whom an exaction has been imposed will, solely by the development of his
subdivision, increase the need for recreational 44facilities to such an extent that
additional land for such facilities will be required.

Therefore, the court held that "the amount and location of land or fees shall
bear a reasonable relationship to the use of the facilities by the future
' 45
inhabitants of the subdivision.
The reasonableness of the relationship required by the Walnut Creek
decision is very generously weighted in favor of the municipality by the
California courts. In Grupe v. California Coastal Commission,46 a California court
upheld a condition imposed in a new development permit requiring the
dedication of two-thirds of a parcel for an easement that would provide access
to a beach on the property. The lot owner had requested a building permit
for a single-family home on a 15,200 square foot beachfront lot. The permit
was conditioned on confinement of construction to 5,000 square feet and
dedication of between 8,000 and 10,000 square feet as a lateral easement (that
is, parallel to the shoreline) for public access and passive recreational use.
Already developed properties surrounding the land at issue were not
burdened with similar easements. Therefore, the land would not be
47
accessible from anywhere except the shoreline below the high tide mark.
Moreover, the easement did not provide access to the beach from a public
road because it ran along the coast. The property owner claimed that the
dedication was not reasonably related to needs that the construction of one
residence created. Nevertheless, the court upheld the mandatory dedication,
reasoning that the condition requiring beach access need not benefit the

43.

4 Cal. 3d 633, 484 P.2d 606, 94 Cal. Rptr. 630, appeal dismissed, 404 U.S. 878 (1971). For a

survey of exaction requirements focusing on California law, see D. Curtin, Jr., Dedications,
Exactions, and In Lieu Fees As a Land Use Planning Tool (Oct. 1985) (unpublished paper presented
at the annual conference of the National Institute of Municipal Law Officers, Philadelphia, Pa.). Mr.
Curtin was counsel for the municipality in the Il'alnul Creek case.

44.

4 Cal. 3d at 639-40, 484 P.2d at 611, 94 Cal. Rptr. at 635.

45.

Id. at 640, 484 P.2d at 612, 94 Cal. Rptr. at 636.

46.

166 Cal. App. 3d 148, 212 Cal. Rptr. 578 (1985).

For another decision upholding

mandatory beach access exactions, see Georgia-Pacific Corp. v. California Coastal Comm'n, 132 Cal.
App. 3d 678, 183 Cal. Rptr. 395 (1982) (upholding exaction but disapproving mandatory lateral and
vertical access easements on noncontiguous parcel); see also Sea Ranch Ass'n v. California Coastal
Coinm'n, 527 F. Supp. 390 (N.D. Cal.), vacatedand remanded, 454 U.S. 1070 (1981), dismissedas moot on
remand. 552 F. Stipp. 241 (N.D. Cal. 1982). By the time of the last decision in Sea Ranch, the plaintiff"
had already accepted the benefit of state legislation that provided compensation of $500,000 for
granting the public access sought by the Coastal Commission.
47. 166 Cal. App. 3d at 156, 212 Cal. Rptr. at 581.
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proposed development. Instead, only an "indirect relationship" between the
exaction and a need attributable to development is required. It stated:
Respondent's beach front home is one more brick in the wall separating the People of
California from the state's tidelands. Although respondent's home alone has not
created the need for access to the tidelands fronting his property, it is one small
project among a myriad of others which together do severely limit public access to the
tidelands and beaches of this state, and therefore collectively create a need for public
access. Thus, the condition exacted to facilitate access is related to a need to which
respondent's project
contributes, even though, standing alone, it has not created the
48
need for access.

The Grupe decision adopted a very generous definition of the reasonable
relationship required between an exaction and a development-generated
need. The decision effectively gives municipalities carte blanche to impose
exactions. The reason is that the construction of the residence proposed in
Grupe could not, except as a matter of abstract theory, have actually created a
need for an easement that granted beach access when the easement did not
even provide direct access to the beach. At this level, exactions become
judicially sanctioned governmental extortion, limited only by the taking rule
that regulations may not deprive property of substantially all economic use.
In contrast with California courts, the Illinois courts take a very strict view
of the relationship that must exist between the exaction and the needs of the
subdivision. In Pioneer Trust and Savings Bank v. Village of Mount Prospect, the
Illinois Supreme Court held that the exaction must be "specifically and
49
uniquely attributable" to the needs of the development:
If the requirement is within the statutory grant of power to the municipality and if the
burden cast upon the subdivider is specifically and uniquely attributable to his activity,
then the [dedication] requirement is permissible; if not, it is forbidden and amounts to
a confiscation of private property in contravention of the constitutional prohibitions
rather than reasonable regulation under the police power. 50

Recently, the Illinois Supreme Court affirmed the specifically and uniquely
attributable test in a decision in which the court stated that it will allow cash
payments in lieu of land dedication if the Pioneer Trust standard is satisfied. 5 1
A Florida court has criticized the reasonable relationship test as giving
local governments "almost unlimited discretion" and has criticized the strictly
and uniquely attributable test for shifting the burden of proof to the
municipality. 5 2 It has instead attempted to steer a middle course between
those two positions by applying a "rational nexus" test that balances the
prospective needs of the community against the property rights of the
developer. The court's reasoning is that subdividing land is ordinarily a
48. Id. at 167, 212 Cal. Rptr. at 589-90 (citations and footnote omitted).
49. 22 I1. 2d 375, 380, 176 N.E.2d 799, 802 (1961).
50. Id.
51. Krughoff v. City of Naperville, 41 111. App. 3d 334, 354 N.E.2d 489 (1976), aff'd, 68 Ill. 2d
352, 369 N.E.2d 892 (1977). The only other state that has adopted a rule similar to the Illinois
standard is Rhode Island. See Frank Ansuini, Inc. v. City of Cranston, 107 R.I. 63, 264 A.2d 910
(1970).
52. Wald Corp. v. Metropolitan Dade County, 338 So. 2d 863 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1976), cert.
denied, 348 So. 2d 955 (1977).
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profitmaking business and, for that purpose, it is appropriate to distinguish
between individual property owners and subdividers whose lots would
become more attractive by imposing conditions that would benefit potential
53
purchasers.
There are limits on the subdivision exaction requirements that courts will
tolerate. Some municipalities have pushed the courts to these limits. A New
York court struck down as an unreasonable municipal exaction a mandatory
dedication of shorefront land that would have diminished by $90,000 the
value of land costing $208,000. 54 The refusal of a different New York
municipality to approve a subdivision plat on the ground that the official map
showed the entire proposed subdivision as a school recreation site was also
invalidated. 5 5 An Ohio court held that a municipality could not require
dedication of a strip of land that would widen a main thoroughfare 700 feet
away from the proposed subdivision. 5 6 Additionally, a New Jersey court held
that a municipality could not require a developer to pay its Board of
Education to finance school construction costs. The court reasoned that the
municipality had no right to refuse approval of the project simply because its
school system would be unable to absorb the increased number of students or
57
because taxes would have to be increased.
C.

Cash Payments In Lieu of Land Dedication

Frequently, the amount of land obtainable through a dedication would be
too small or too poorly placed to be useful to the public. On the theory that
each subdivision ought to pay its fair share of the cost of providing
recreational and school lands, however, many municipalities have adopted the
practice of requiring a cash payment in lieu of the land dedication in order to
furnish funds for subsequent acquisition of larger parcels of land. The early
decisions addressing the cash-in-lieu payments issue struck down such
requirements, commonly on the ground that there was no statutory authority
for substituting cash payments for dedications. 58 Recently, however, the
validity of cash-in-lieu payments has been sustained by the courts. For
example, the Walnut Creek court upheld such payments. 59 In reaching its
decision, the court rejected a claim that cash-in-lieu payments constituted a
53.

Id. at 868.

54. East Neck Estates, Ltd. v. Luchsinger, 61 Misc. 2d 619, 305 N.Y.S.2d 922 (Sup. Ct. 1969).
55. Kessler v. Town of Shelter Island Planning Bd., 40 A.D.2d 1005, 338 N.Y.S.2d 778 (1972).
56. McKain v. Toledo City Plan Comm'n, 26 Ohio App. 2d 171, 270 N.E.2d 370 (1971).
57. Midtown Properties, Inc. v. Township of Madison, 68 NJ. Super. 197, 172 A.2d 40 (Law
Div. 1961), aff'd, 78 NJ. Super. 471, 189 A.2d 226 (App. Div. 1963); see also West Park Ave., Inc. v.
Township of Ocean, 48 N.J. 122, 224 A.2d 1 (1966) (holding that a municipality could not require
payments of $300 per house to Board of Education as condition for issuance of certificates of
occupancy).
58. See, e.g., Rosen v. Village of Downers Grove, 19 Ill. 2d 448, 167 N.E.2d 230 (1960);
Coronado Dev. Co. v. City of McPherson, 189 Kan. 174, 368 P.2d 51 (1962); Haugen v. Gleason, 226
Or. 99, 359 P.2d 108 (1961).
59. Associated Home Builders v. City of Walnut Creek, 4 Cal. 3d 633, 642, 484 P.2d 606, 61314, 94 Cal. Rptr. 630, 637, appeal dismissed, 404 U.S. 878 (1971). For a discussion of the Il'alnut Creek
decision, see supra text accompanying note 43.
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double tax because the purchase price of new resident homes would include
the amount of the in-lieu payment as well as subsequent property taxes for
development and maintenance of open areas acquired. 60 In Jordan v. Village of
Menomonee Falls, 6 1 the Wisconsin Supreme Court upheld an ordinance
requiring a subdivider to pay $200 per lot instead of dedicating land at that
value for school, park, or recreational needs. The Jordan court determined
that the statute authorized the municipality to require such payments when
the Planning Commission determined that dedication of land for those
purposes was unfeasible. 6 2 A Utah court upheld an ordinance requiring the
developer to pay the cash equivalent of seven percent of the subdivided land
for flood control and recreational purposes. 6 3 Additionally, the Illinois
Supreme Court limited its earlier Rosen decision to its facts and upheld cash
64
payments in lieu of land dedication.
There remains a further pitfall. If not carefully drafted, a court may
determine that a cash-in-lieu payment is a special tax violating the uniform
taxation requirement. Moreover, if the cash-in-lieu payment is characterized
as a tax, it may be invalid for want of specific statutory authority. 6 5 An
Oregon court held that a cash-in-lieu payment was in fact an unauthorized tax
because the payments were to become part of the public funds of the county
and used either by the county or the school district for land acquisition.
Furthermore, there was no limitation on the uses of these funds to ensure that
the money collected would be used to directly benefit subdivisions
regulated. 66 A Santa Fe, New Mexico ordinance that required payment of a
$50 per lot fee into a public facilities fund imposed in connection with
67
subdivision plat approval was also struck down as an unauthorized city tax.
One California court, however, recently held that a dedication or cash-in-lieu
60. Id. at 642, 484 P.2d at 613-14, 94 Cal. Rptr. at 637-38.
61. 28 Wis. 2d 608, 137 N.W.2d 442 (1965).
62. Id. at 620-21, 137 N.W.2d at 449.
63. Call v. City of W. Jordan, 606 P.2d 217 (Utah 1979); see also Jenad, Inc. v. Village of
Scarsdale, 18 N.Y.2d 78, 218 N.E.2d 673, 271 N.Y.S.2d 955 (1966).
64. Krughoffv. City of Naperville, 4 Ill. 2d 334, 54 N.E.2d 489 (1976), aff'd, 68 Ill. 2d 352, 369
N.E.2d 892 (1977); cf. Board of Educ. v. Surety Devs., Inc., 63 Ill. 2d 193, 347 N.E.2d 149 (1975)
(enforcing an agreement to make cash contributions for school construction as condition to
obtaining special use permit for subdivision sewage treatment plant). In Plote, Inc. v. Minnesota
Alden Co., 96 II. App. 3d 1001, 422 N.E.2d 231 (1981), an Illinois appellate court stated that "the
Illinois Supreme Court is currently tending toward a more liberal interpretation of the validity of
exaction ordinances while maintaining the requirements of proportionality and specific
attributability." Id. at 1006, 422 N.E.2d at 235-36. The appellate court also emphasized, however,
that the standard was stringent, stating: "the test in Illinois is more demanding than a cursory search
for some connection, however tenuous, between the municipality's exaction and the public welfare."
Id. The court hinted that it would have invalidated a $100 per dwelling unit exaction for a
community cultural center had the plaintiff developer not been estopped from challenging the
exaction ordinance.
65. See, e.g., City of Montgomery v. Crossroads Land Co., 355 So. 2d 363 (Ala. 1978).
66. Haugen v. Gleason, 226 Or. 99, 105, 359 P.2d 108, 111 (1961).
67. Sanchez v. City of Santa Fe, 82 N.M. 322, 481 P.2d 401 (1971); cf. Lafferty v. Payson City,
642 P.2d 376, 378 (Utah 1982) (building permit impact fee of$1,000 per dwelling unit deposited in
general fund was really illegal tax); Hillis Homes, Inc. v. Snohomish County, 97 Wash. 2d 804, 650
P.2d 193 (1982) ($250 per-lot fee for past acquisition was unauthorized tax) (superseded by WASH.
REV. CODE ANN. § 82.02.020 (Supp. 1987)).
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requirement is not a special tax requiring two-thirds referendum approval
under Proposition 13.68
IV
THE FLORIDA IMPACT FEE CASES

The general success of municipalities in sustaining provisions requiring
land dedication or cash payments in lieu thereof has emboldened them to go
even further by dropping the land dedication requirement altogether and
simply imposing a fee on land development for construction of public
improvements. These exactions are called "impact fees" and they arejustifed
on the theory that it is possible to allocate to each development its
proportionate share of the future cost of providing public services such as
69
parks and highway improvements.
To date, much of the litigation over impact fees has occurred in Florida.
The initial effort to impose impact fees in Florida fared poorly in Broward
County v. Janis Development. 70 In that case, the court held that a land use fee,
collected to fund the cost of constructing or improving roads, streets,
highways, and bridges serving the vicinity of the development, was not an
appropriate exercise of regulatory authority. Instead, it constituted an invalid
form of taxation because it did not specify how or when the money would be
spent.]'
The case that set the stage in Florida for the subsequent impact fee
decisions was Contractors & Builders Association v. City of Dunedin.7 2 In that case,
a Florida appellate court upheld the imposition of a fee on the construction of
homes and buildings levied at the time of connection to municipal water and
sewage systems. The designation of the connection fees as payment for the
capital costs of expanding the city's water and sewer system was crucial to the
73
validity of the Dunedin ordinance.
The next impact fee case to reach a Florida court was Hollywood, Inc. v.
Broward County. 74 A Broward County ordinance required, as a condition of
plat approval, the dedication of land or a fee payment in order to assist the
county in acquiring and developing county level parks. Under the Broward
ordinance, the subdivider had three alternatives. He could: (1) dedicate three
acres of land for every 1,000 residents of the proposed subdivision; (2) pay an
68. Trent Meredith, Inc. v. City of Oxnard, 114 Cal. App. 3d 317, 170 Cal. Rptr. 685 (1981).
69. For a fuller discussion of impact fees, see Juergensmeyer & Blake, Impact Fees: An Answer to
Local Government's Capital Funding Dilemnia, 9 FLA. ST. U.L. REV. 415 (1981).
70. 311 So. 2d 371 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1975).
71. Id. at 376.
72. 358 So. 2d 846 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1978), cert. denied, 370 So. 2d 458, cert. denied. 444 U.S.
867 (1979).
73. Id. at 847-48. The Florida Supreme Court had previously invalidated the Dunedin
ordin-nice because it had placed insufficient restrictions on the use of the money collected.
Contractors & Builders Ass'n v. City of Dunedin, 329 So. 2d 314 (Fla. 1976). The later decision
upheld the ordinance after it had been amended to provide for the earmarking of funds. 358 So. 2d
at 846, 848 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1978), cert. denied, 370 So. 2d 458, cert. denied, 444 U.S. 867 (1979).
74. 431 So. 2d 606 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.), cert. denied, 440 So. 2d 352 (1983).
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amount of money equivalent to the value of land that would have been
dedicated; or (3) pay the impact fee set by a schedule in the ordinance. 7 5 The
court first held that the required dedication of three acres of land for every
1,000 residents was not unreasonably high. Indeed, the court felt the
standard might even be low. It also noted that the county had employed
various mechanisms designed to meet the needs of the current population for
county level parks, including a $73 million bond issue. The county's evidence
also demonstrated that growth generated by new subdivisions would require
the county to acquire and develop new lands in order to maintain its three
acres per 1,000 residents standard. 76 Moreover, the Broward ordinance
required collected funds to be expended
within a reasonable period of time, for the purpose of acquiring and developing land
necessary to meet the need for county level parks created by the development in order
to provide a system of county level parks7 7which will be available to and substantially
benefit the residents of the platted area.

The ordinance limited use of the funds to acquiring and developing new
park land within fifteen miles of the platted land. The court held that
requirements such as those in the Broward ordinance are permissible as long
as they "offset needs sufficiently attributable to the subdivision and so long as
the funds collected are sufficiently earmarked for the substantial benefit of the
subdivision residents." 78 The court established a two-part test that places the

burden of proof on the county. The local government must first demonstrate
a reasonable connection, or rational nexus, between the need for additional
facilities and growth in population generated by the subdivision. Second, it
must show a rational nexus between the expenditure of the funds collected
and the benefits accruing to the subdivision. To satisfy the second test, the
ordinance must specifically earmark the funds collected for use in acquiring
capital facilities to benefit the new residents. 79 The Broward County
ordinance passed muster because the county demonstrated that the three
acres per 1,000 residents standard was reasonable, and because the fifteenmile provision and the earmarking of funds ensured that the sums collected
would be used to acquire capital facilities for the benefit of new residents.8 0
At issue in the second Florida impact fee case, Home Builders & Contractors
Association v. Board of County Commissioners,8 was an impact fee established to
fund the construction of roads, the need for which was generated by increased
traffic from the new development. The Palm Beach County ordinance
required any new land development activity that generated traffic to pay a fair
share of the reasonably anticipated cost of expanding or constructing roads
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.

Id. at
Id. at
Id.
Id. at
Id.at
Id.at

607-08.
612.
611.
611-12.
612.

81. 446 So. 2d 140 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1983), cert.
denied, 451 So. 2d 848, appeal disissed, 409
U.S. 976 (1984).
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attributable to the new development.8 2 Utilizing a formula that took into
account the cost of road construction and the number of motor vehicle trips
generated by different types of land use, the ordinance required a fee of $300
per unit for single family housing, $200 per unit for multiple family dwellings,
$175 per unit for mobile homes, and other amounts for commercial or other
development. Payment of the fee was required upon commencement of any
new land development activity that would generate traffic. An unusual feature
of the ordinance was that it established a trust fund for each of forty zones
into which the county was divided. Funds collected from building activity in a
particular zone could only be spent in that zone within six years after
collection, or the money would be returned to the present owner of the
83
property.
The court held that although Palm Beach County was a noncharter county
and thus did not have home rule authority, the county did have the power and
authority to enact the ordinance as long as the exaction constituted a
regulatory fee rather than a tax. 84 The court rejected an argument that the
ordinance was invalid on the ground that there might be some disparity
between those who benefit and those who pay. It also rejected the contention
that benefits accruing from roads constructed with the impact fees must inure
exclusively or overwhelmingly to the subdivision residents. 8 5 The developer
also argued that the ordinance violated equal protection rights because it was
arbitrary and discriminatory. The basis for this argument was that the Florida
Constitution permits municipalities to opt out of application of the ordinance,
and thirty-three of the thirty-seven municipalities in the county had done so.
The court rejected this argument, reasoning that the constitutional guarantee
86
of equal protection does not require territorial uniformity.
As the court also noted, the most difficult point raised on appeal was the
claim that the Palm Beach County impact fee constituted a tax rather than a
regulatory fee. The court stated that the distinction between the two "almost
seems to become more amorphous rather than less." 87 The court found that
the ordinance was not a tax because it met the tests articulated in Dunedin and
because the evidence demonstrated that the rapid rate of new development in
the county required a substantial increase in the capacity of the county road
system. It also found that the construction cost of those roads would far
exceed the fair share of fees imposed by the ordinance, and that the formula
for calculating the amount of the fee was not rigid and inflexible. Instead, the
formula allowed the developer to furnish his own independent study of traffic
and economic data in order to demonstrate that his share should be less than
the amount set under the ordinance formula. Finally, the localization of the
82.

Id. at 141.

83.
84.
85.
86.
87.

Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at

Id.

142.
142-43.
143-44.
144.
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expenditure of funds through the zone system also served to differentiate the
impact fee from a tax. 88
The Florida line of cases suggests that there are five requirements for a
valid impact fee ordinance. First, there must be a carefully documented
estimate of the cost of acquiring and constructing new public facilities.
Second, there must be a reasonable formula for determining the portion of
the cost imposed on new developments, and it should appear that the local
government is not attempting to thrust the entire burden of new public
facilities onto new developments. Third, the funds collected must be
segregated and earmarked instead of being mingled with general public
funds. Fourth, the expenditure of the funds must be localized in order to
increase the likelihood that residents of the new development will benefit
from the facilities. Finally, there must be a time limit within which the funds
can be expended and a provision for refunds if the time limit is exceeded. 9
This last provision ensures that the funds will actually be spent to benefit
residents of the new development.
V
THE WHEEL TRACES A FULL CIRCLE: THE RETURN OF THE SPECIAL
ASSESSMENT, WITH A DIFFERENCE
While Florida municipalities were experimenting with impact fees,
California was reintroducing the special assessment, but with some significant

differences. Laboring under the ad valorem tax limitations of Proposition
13,90 California municipalities utilized the special assessment in order to raise
cash for public facilities.

88. Id. at 145.
89. In Town of Longboat Key v. Lands End, Ltd., 433 So. 2d 574 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1983), a
Florida appellate court held that an impact fee for preserving or acquiring parks and open spaces was
an unconstitutional tax because there was no guarantee that the funds collected would actually be
used to develop parks, the need for which was generated by new construction. The Florida Omnibus
Growth Management Act of 1985, FLA. STAT. ANN. § 380.06(15)(d)(West Supp. 1986), provides
standards for judicial review of impact fees. The statute requires that dedications and impact fees
meet three criteria. First, the need for construction of new facilities or additions to present facilities
must be reasonably attributable to the proposed development subjected to the fee or dedication. Id.
§ 380.06(15)(d)(1). Second, any required dedication of land or contribution of funds or public
facilities must be comparable to the funds that would have to be expended or to the land or public
facilities that would have to be provided by government to accommodate the impact occasioned by
the development. Id. § 380.06(15)(d)(2). Third, all land dedications and funds contributed must be
specifically designated for, and employed in, the mitigation of impacts reasonably attributable to the
proposed development. Id.§ 380.06(15)(d)(3).
90. CAL. CONST. art. XIIIA (1978). The impact of Proposition 13 on the finances of California
municipalities was documented in a series of articles in the San Francisco Chronicle from October 28
to October 31, 1985. The Chronicle charged:
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The stage was set by the decision in Solvang Municipal Improvenent District v.
Board of Supervisors,9 ' in which the court articulated what it considered the
distinguishing features of the special assessment technique:
[A] special assessment, sometimes described as a local assessment, is a charge imposed
on particular real property for a local public improvement of direct benefit to that
property, as for example a street improvement, lighting improvement, irrigation
improvement, sewer connection, drainage improvement, or flood control
improvement. The rationale of special assessment is that the assessed property has
received a special benefit over and above that received by the general public. The
general public should not be required to pay for special benefits for the few, and the
few specially benefited should not be subsidized by the general public .... Although a
special assessment is imposed through the same mechanism used to finance the cost of
local government, in reality it is a compulsory charge to recoup the cost of a public
improvement made for the special benefit of particular property. It has been said that,
strictly speaking, a special assessment is not a tax at all, but a benefit to specific real
property financed through use of public credit....
S.. In sum, a special assessment is a charge levied against real property particularly
and directly benefited
by a local improvement in order to pay the cost of that
92
improvement.

The Solvang decision enabled municipalities to finance public improvements
with special assessments free of the Proposition 13 limitation on ad valorem
real property taxes by sweeping into the assessment category any charge
levied against real property that could be benefited by some public
improvement.
The City of San Diego was one of the first municipalities to capitalize on
the opportunities made available by the Solvang decision. By ordinance, it
required public facilities in parts of the community designated as "planned
urbanizing areas" to be financed by "special assessment proceedings,
considerations from developers, the City's General Fund or some
combination thereof."-93 Public improvements included water mains, utilities,
sewers, drainage systems, streets and sidewalks, parks, transit and
transportation, libraries, fire stations, school buildings, police stations, and
presumably anything else considered by municipalities. The ordinance also
designated a "fixed benefit area" (FBA) for proposed developments, and
Although the prevailing wisdom insists that the measure's principal legacy has been a windfall
saving for property owners and a simpler, fairer tax code, there is also a less appealing heritage.
It can be found in crumbling roads and worn-out bridges, in crowded classrooms and a
soaring high school drop-out rate ....
Perhaps most egregiously, it is apparent in the existence of 'tax-rich' and 'tax poor' counties,
cities and citizens-where new inequities and hardships exact their greatest toll from those who
can least afford it ....

In education, public works and the less tangible but no less substantive issues of fairness,
Proposition 13's effect has been both arguably harmful and increasingly apparent.
San Francisco Chronicle, Oct. 28, 1985, at 1, col. 1.
91. 112 Cal. App. 3d 545, 169 Cal. Rptr. 391 (1980).
92. Id. at 552-54, 169 Cal. Rptr. at 395-96.
93. SAN DIEGO, CAL., MUN. CODE § 61.2200(e) (1980). Application of the ordinance is discussed
at length inJ.W.Jones Cos. v. City of San Diego, 157 Cal. App. 3d 745, 749, 203 Cal. Rptr. 580, 583
(1984).
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provided for allocation of benefit assessments to each undeveloped parcel in
the FBA. These assessments would become a lien on undeveloped parcels,
and would have to be paid when a building permit was issued or when the
capital improvements program for an area called for commencement of the
particular public facilities project. 9 4 Presumably, deferred assessments would
affect only those lands for which no building permit had yet been sought. As
applied, the ordinance permitted protests and hearings with respect to the
95
benefit assessments.
There are several novel concepts in the San Diego FBA scheme. First,
benefit assessments have traditionally been used for public improvements
such as streets, water mains, and sewers. By utilizing benefit assessments to
fund transit systems and fire stations, the FBA scheme extends the use of
benefit assessments to those public facilities traditionally financed out of
general revenues. The FBA scheme proceeds on the assumption that it is
possible to allocate to each developer his proportionate share of providing
such facilities. Second, the fixed benefit assessment is payable in one lump
sum at the time the building permit is issued or, if the improvement has not
yet commenced, at the time of commencement. 9 6 The other remarkable
feature of the fixed benefit assessment is that it potentially imposes double
payments on the developer by exposing him to both traditional forms of
subdivision exactions under the Walnut Creek rule 97 as well as a second round
of payments at the time the fixed benefit assessment becomes due. This
innovative tour deforce effectively shifts the burden of providing public facilities
largely to newcomers because the cost of these facilities is reflected in the
price of new housing. This burden shifting is also reflected in Proposition 13,
which allows only very small annual increments in ad valorem real property
taxation. Upon the sale of property, however, Proposition 13 permits the
assessment valuation, and thus the amount of ad valorem taxes, to rise to the
price at which the property is sold. 98 Under such a system, the new purchaser
will pay significantly more than the present owner.
In J. W Jones Companies v. City of San Diego,9 9 a California appellate court
held that the fixed benefit assessment technique was not a tax that required
voter approval under Proposition 13.100 TheJ. W Jones court used the Solvang
decision001 as the starting point of its analysis. The fixed benefit assessment
looked, at least superficially, like a special tax because the funds were
94. SAN DIEGO, CAL., MUN. CODE §§ 661.2209-.2210 (1980); see also 157 Cal. App. 3d at 749, 203
Cal. Rptr. at 583.
95. SAN DIEGO, CAL., MUN. CODE §§ 61.2206-2207 (1980); see also 157 Cal. App. 3d at 750, 203
Cal. Rptr. at 583.
96. SAN DIEGO, CAL., MUN. CODE § 61.2210 (1980); see also 157 Cal. App. 3d at 749-50, 203 Cal.
Rptr. at 583.
97. 4 Cal. 3d 633, 484 P.2d 606, 94 Cal. Rptr. 630, appeal dismissed, 404 U.S. 878 (1971). See
supra text accompanying notes 43-45 for a discussion of the Wablut Creek decision.
98. CAL. CONST. art. XIIIA (1978). Proposition 13 is discussed inJ . Jones, 157 Cal. App. 3d at
751, 203 Cal. Rptr. at 584.
99. 157 Cal. App. 3d 745, 203 Cal. Rptr. 580 (1984).
100. Id. at 758, 203 Cal. Rptr. at 589.
101. See supra text accompanying notes 91-92 for a discussion of the Solvang decision.
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collected and earmarked for one or more special purposes and were
deposited in the city's general fund. The court acknowledged that the fixed
benefit assessment had its roots in state legislation generally providing for
public facility financing by apportioning the cost among properties specially
benefited by the facilities. The court, however, concluded:
Substantively, the ordinance and the FBA are but distant cousins to those familiar
public work financing arrangements which contemplate the fixing of times for the
commencement and completion of the work, the award of contracts for the work, the
spread of the cost of the work to property specially benefited by it and the assessment
of the benefited parcels to pay the cost of 0the
work through the issuance of bonds
2
constituting a lien on the benefited parcel.'

The San Diego ordinance was not "clothed in this traditional attire."' 0 3 The
fixed benefit assessment impressed a lien only on enclaves of undeveloped
property within the area of benefit. Moreover, the assessment would not be
used to fund present public facilities, but only facilities installed in the future.
The cost for these future public facilities could be measured in current
dollars, and this figure could be adjusted upward or downward depending
upon economic conditions. Furthermore, the court acknowledged that while
traditional assessments are spread on a front foot, square foot, or ad valorem
basis, the fixed benefit assessment used none of those techniques. Instead,
the assessment was apportioned "according to the number of 'net equivalent
dwelling units' attributable to each parcel at its highest potential development
0 4
under current zoning."1
The San Diego formula did not take into account the location of an
assessed parcel with respect to any particular development. Nevertheless, the
court declined to find that the fixed benefit assessment was a special tax. Its
reasoning, however, was a bit weak. The court relied on the fact that the
assessments did not exceed the cost of improvements, were not made on an
ad valorem basis, and did not result in personal liability. The court did not
hold that contiguity was necessary in order to confer a benefit since, in levying
the assessment, the city had considered the proximity of the parcels to the
public facilities. The court determined that the plaintiff had failed to establish
an absence of benefit and that the city's determination of benefit was
conclusive. 10 5
The J. W Jones court dismissed the objection that developed properties
were excluded from the fixed benefit assessment because they were already
served by adequate public facilities and because the owners of the developed
properties had not initiated the fixed benefit assessment proceedings. The
court acknowledged that already developed parcels might derive some
incidental benefit from the new facilities, but it "perceive[d] no discriminatory
classification between developed and undeveloped properties." 106
102.
103.
104.
105.
106.

157 Cal. App. 3d at 755, 203 Cal. Rptr. at 587.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 756, 203 Cal. Rptr. at 588.
Id. at 757, 203 Cal. Rptr. at 589.
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The court also reversed the trial court's determination that each of the
twenty-five separate improvements scheduled for construction in the fixed
benefit area between 1981 and 1990 should be separately measured to
determine the extent of the benefit conferred upon undeveloped parcels by
each of those improvements. The court held that "the aggregation of all the
improvements in the FBA and the spread of their costs to the undeveloped
parcels in the area of benefit was proper."' 10 7 The court noted that a
"piecemeal approach" would defeat the city's general policies for
development as set out in its community plan. Whether the assessment would
exceed the benefit to any particular parcel apparently did not concern the
court. 10 8

In effect, theJ. W. Jones court decided that precedent was not as important
as municipal financial flexibility. In a somewhat lyrical passage, it stated:
In sum, the ordinance is the key to implementing San Diego's controlled growth
concept as formalized by the general plan and community plan. The narrow strictures
of general law concepts of financing public facilities as embedded in acts such as the
Improvement Act of 1911 or the Municipal Improvement Act of 1913 do not
accommodate the dynamics of explosive growth in sunbelt cities. The undeveloped
perimeters of urban centers require to be controlled in their growth not on a street by
street basis looking to adjacent properties to bear improvement costs, but from the
perspective of future communities planned to be complete in themselves. The vision
of San Diego's future as sketched in the general plan is attainable only through the
comprehensive financing scheme contemplated by the FBA. We view the precedents
of yesterday's case law, not as barriers to growth, but as the guidelines to accomplish
the needs of tomorrow. We hold the ordinance as applied here is a valid exercise of
San Diego's power to require undeveloped land to bear the costs of the public
facilities necessary for the health and welfare of the future residents of North
University City. 109

The success of theJ. W.Jones decision in shifting the cost of public facilities
from the general public to newcomers alone is evident in the allocation of
costs associated with the fixed benefit area in the case itself. The total cost of
public facilities allocated to the North University City FBA was set at
$54,776,747. Of that amount, $25,763,289 would be paid by developers as
traditional subdivision exactions. Another $26,852,923 would be paid by the
owners of undeveloped parcels through the fixed benefit assessment when
they secured building permits. Only $1,802,937 would be paid out of the
city's general revenues, and the balance of $357,598 would come from
unidentified other sources. 1 0 Thus, the developers and landowners (who, in
the case of most multilot residential developments, are one and the same)
would pay 96% of the cost of providing public facilities for the fixed benefit
area. For San Diego municipal finance officers and elected officials, the
developers' absorption of such a high percentage of the total cost of providing
public facilities is a very exciting prospect. And, by the time this article is
published, the idea will have surely spread to other California municipalities.
107.
108.
109.
110.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 757-58, 203 Cal. Rptr. at 589.
Id. at 750, 203 Cal. Rptr. at 583.

LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS

[Vol. 50: No. I

Indeed, it seems that word of such a scheme spread even before its validity
was decided. City attorneys of San Jose, Atascadero, Long Beach, Los
Angeles, Monterey, Palm Springs, Pasadena, San Francisco, Santa Barbara,
and Stockton all joined as amici curiae in the case, exhibiting the intense
interest of other municipalities in the outcome of the case.' II
The revival of the special assessment in its modern form has potential
problems. It is possible that the assessment levied on a particular parcel will
exceed the benefit conferred on the property. If it does, to the extent of the
excess, the assessment is a taking of private property in violation of the fifth
and fourteenth amendments.1 12 Moreover, to provide a forum for this type of
complaint, the municipality will usually hold a public hearing. Some states
further require judicial confirmation of the allocation, and judicial review of a
claim that a particular assessment constitutes a taking is always available.
Prolonged public hearings and the judicial review processes could thus render
the scheme administratively unworkable.
Not all state courts have been as tolerant of the reintroduction of special
assessments as have the California courts. In Montgomery County v. Schultze, 113
a Maryland appellate court blocked the county's effort to shift onto abutting
property owners the entire cost of constructing a cross-county connector road
that would primarily serve the general public's transportation needs. The
court held that in order to levy a special benefit assessment against properties
adjoining a road there must be: (1) a reasonable relationship between the
actual enhancement in value of the abutting property and the amount of the
assessment; and (2) an apportionment of the cost between general public
benefit and private special benefit. In this case, the assessment failed to
reflect apportionment of the cost between public and private benefit and
therefore lacked a demonstrable relationship between the assessment and
some private benefit. 1 14 It is not likely that the San Diego fixed benefit
assessment would survive this type of analysis.
It remains to be seen whether the fixed benefit assessment will really
produce funds for the construction of public facilities or simply chill new
development. It is clear, however, that to the extent that developers in
California are required to shoulder the financial burden cities are thrusting
upon them, they will ultimately pass that burden on to newcomers in the form
of increased housing costs. The fixed benefit assessment also has the effect of
exempting those who currently reside in the city from sharing the cost of the
benefit, thereby increasing prices in the already inflated residential property
market in California. 1 15
111. Id. at 747, 203 Cal. Rptr. at 581.
112. See, e.g., City of Treasure Island v. Strong, 215 So. 2d 473, 476 (Fla. 1968).
113. 302 Md. 481, 489 A.2d 16 (Ct. App. 1985).
114. Id. at 490, 489 A.2d at 20-21.
115. The costs of complying with California's environmental review and environmental impact
mitigation requirements have already made a substantial contribution to increased housing costs in
that state. See B. FRIEDEN, THE ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION HUSTLE 52-59 (1979).
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VI
LINKAGE: IMPACT FEES AS A TOOL OF SOCIAL POLICY

The most recent development in the field of municipal financial exactions
has been the extension of the impact fee concept. Formerly, impact fees were
used to finance various types of public facilities. Recently, municipalities have
required developers both to finance and construct new residences that are
distinctly nonpublic. Two cities, San Francisco and Boston, have adopted
programs that link the right to construct new commercial space to the
construction or financing of new housing, on the theory that the construction
of new office buildings generates a need for housing.
The San Francisco Office Housing Production Program (OHPP) imposes
on developers of office projects exceeding 50,000 square feet of office space a
concurrent obligation to provide for the development of housing." 6 This
requirement is imposed to offset the increased housing demand that office
development presumably would generate. In order to calculate the housing
demand generated by new office development, city planners made the
following assumptions: forty percent of new workers will seek housing in San
Francisco, a typical worker occupies 250 square feet of office space, and one
residential dwelling unit houses 1.8 persons. Using these assumptions, the
planners determined the number of new residential units required by an office
development by dividing the gross square feet of office space by 250 square
feet per employee and multiplying that result by .22 (which is .4 employees
divided by 1.8 persons per residential unit). 117 Thus, the developer of a
300,000 square foot office building would be required to provide 264 new
residential units. The developer can satisfy the linked housing requirement in
one of three ways. He can directly construct or restore the housing himself,
he can provide financial aid to a developer for the construction of housing
that could not be built without the assistance, or he can invest $6,000 per
required housing unit for a period of at least thirty years in the city's shared
18
appreciation mortgage revenue bond program.'
The San Francisco program is designed to provide housing for persons of
low or moderate income and to encourage the construction of housing units
with multiple bedrooms. Each bedroom in a dwelling unit counts as one
housing unit. Therefore, by constructing units with more than one bedroom,
the developer can earn additional housing credits. For example, constructing
a three-bedroom apartment would earn him three housing credits. Additional
credits are available for constructing affordable housing units for rental or
sale to low- or moderate-income households or persons. Two housing credits
are awarded for each affordable housing unit developed for rental or sale that
is assisted by governmental rental or operating subsidies. If the developer is
116. San Francisco, Cal., Ordinance 358-85 (Aug. 18, 1985); see Share & Diamond, San Francisco's
Office-Housing Production Program, LAND USE & ZONING DIG., Oct. 1983, at 4, 5.
117. See Share & Diamond, supra note 116, at 5.

118. San Francisco, Cal., Ordinance 358-85, § 2(e)-(g) (Aug. 18, 1985); Share & Diamond, supra
note 116, at 5.
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unassisted by rental or operating subsidies, he receives three housing credits
for building affordable housing units for moderate-income households and
four credits for building affordable housing units for low-income households.
In each instance, the developer must guarantee the availability of those
housing units to low- or moderate-income residents for at least twenty
years.1 9 Thus, in a hypothetical example, a developer could reduce a linkage
obligation of 264 housing units to eighty-eight by building only threebedroom apartments. If all of those apartments were available to low-income
persons, the developer could reduce his linkage obligation to twenty-two
dwelling units.
Initially, the city relied on the California Environmental Quality Act
(CEQA) 120 as the authority for adoption of the Office Housing Production
Program. As Share and Diamond have noted:
This state statute allows a city to require mitigation of a project's significant
environmental effects. Private projects subject to local discretionary approval, such as
downtown office buildings, must meet the CEQA requirements. The city reasoned

that new office buildings attract new worker-residents to San Francisco, thereby
exacerbating its existing housing shortage. Consequently, the city argued, new office
buildings have an impact on the social environment that office developers must
mitigate by contributing to the production of housing.121

In 1981, the California State Legislature explicitly scotched this theory by
amending CEQA to limit the scope of mitigable impacts to those affecting the
physical environment. 122 Since then, San Francisco has relied solely upon the
discretionary power of the City Planning Commission to grant or deny
permits for large-scale projects as the source of authority for the OHPP
12 3
exaction.
The Boston linkage program is somewhat different' l2 4 It does not require
payment or commitment of the entire exaction as a precondition to project
approval. Nor does it require the developer of office space to construct lowincome housing. Instead, it provides him with extended payment and
construction alternatives.
The Boston linkage requirement was adopted as an addition to the zoning
ordinance. 2 5 As amended, the ordinance provides that any building or
structure having a gross floor area of more than 100,000 square feet, or that
will be enlarged enough to exceed 100,000 square feet, is designated as a
"development impact project."' 2 6 An applicant seeking approval of a
119. San Francisco, Cal., Ordinance 358-85, § 2(e)(1) (Aug. 18, 1985); Share & Diamond, supra
note 116, at 5.
120. CAL. PUB. RES. CODE §§ 21000-21176 (West 1986).
121. Share & Diamond, supra note 116, at 6.
122. 1981 Cal. Stat. 1352 (codified as amended at CAL. PUB. RES. CODE § 21151 (West 1986)).
123. Share & Diamond, supra note 116, at 6.
124. BOSTON, MASS., ZONING CODE art. 26 (1983), amended by BOSTON, MASS., ZONING CODE art.
26A (1986). A mayoral task force proposal on which article 26 was substantially modeled is
described in ADVISORY GROUP, LINKAGE BETWEEN DOWNTOWN DEVELOPMENT AND NEIGHBORHOOD
HOUSING: REPORT TO THE MAYOR 12-20 (1983).
125. Article 26 became effective on December 29, 1983. Subsequent amendments to the
ordinance, embodied in article 26A, became effective on February 27, 1986.
126. BOSTON, MASS., ZONING CODE art. 26A, § 2(1) (1986).
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development impact project may make a housing payment exaction of five
dollars for each square foot of gross floor area in excess of 100,000 square
feet. 12 7 The developer must make this payment to a Neighborhood Housing
Trust in seven equal annual installments with the first installment due upon
issuance of the building permit, followed by six payments due annually
thereafter. 28 The funds paid into the Neighborhood Housing Trust will be
used for construction of low- and moderate-income housing units.
Alternatively, the developer can comply with the housing payment exaction by
"creating or causing to be created" low- and moderate-income housing units
at a cost at least equal to that of the housing payment exaction. 29
The distinctive feature of the Boston program is that the zoning process is
used to trigger the requirement for development impact payments. The
ordinance requires that persons applying for a variance, a conditional use
permit, an exception, or a zoning map or text amendment pursuant to a
development impact project plan must also enter into an agreement with the
Boston Redevelopment Authority and the Neighborhood Housing Trust to
pay the development impact project exaction.' 30 By defining all construction
or expansion of buildings or structures in excess of 100,000 square feet as
development impact projects, the ordinance sweeps all such development into
the category of projects requiring payment of an impact fee.
The Boston linkage program was in place for eighteen months before the
first judicial challenge to it was filed.' 3 ' That challenge did not come from a
developer unwilling to pay the housing payment exaction. Instead, a Boston
developer challenged a zoning approval given to Massachusetts General
Hospital for a long-range hospital expansion program on the ground that the
linkage payments biased the zoning process in favor of developers who could
make higher payments to the Neighborhood Housing Trust. 13 2
A Chicago mayoral task force has recommended the creation of a "linked
development fund" that would provide financial assistance to private efforts
for residential, commercial, and industrial development in Chicago's
neighborhoods. 133 Among several proposed sources of revenue for the
program is a ten dollar per square foot exaction fee on all developments of
more than 50,000 square feet. The fee would be paid in five increments, two
dollars per square foot at the time a building permit is issued and the balance
127.

Id. § 3(2).

128. Id. § 2(3)(b).
129. Id. § 2(3)(a).
130. Id. § 3.
131. The Boston Globe, June 20, 1985, at 24, col. 1.
132. See id.
133. Advisory Comm. on Linked Dev., Draft Report (June 21, 1985) [hereinafter Draft Report],
reported in Chicago Tribune, Aug. 26, 1985, § 1, at 1, col. 8. The task force recommendation was not
unanimous. Five members filed a vigorous minority report, and the task force proposal, which was
apparently leaked prematurely, has sparked considerable public controversy. See Chicago Tribune,
Aug. 26, 1985, § 1, at 1, col. 8; id. Sept. 2, 1985, § 4, at 3, col. 1. The proposed plan also included
recommendations for an annual ten cent per square foot "use tax" on all office and commercial space
and voluntary development payments into the "linked development fund" to secure increased floor
area ratios.
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in four equal annual installments after issuance of an occupancy certificate. 34
Thus, the developer of a 1 million square foot office tower would pay $2
million when he applied for a building permit and an additional $8 million in
each of the first four years after the building is completed. The funds
collected would be used "to generate neighborhood-based jobs; improve,
conserve or increase the city's housing stock available to low and moderate
35
income residents; and improve and expand the city's economic base."'
As proposed, the Chicago plan contains a significant weakness not present
in the San Francisco and the Boston linkage plans. The Chicago plan is not
specifically designed for the construction of new housing, but more for the
purpose of neighborhood development, a concept that as yet remains vague.
It will be difficult enough to sustain a housing linkage program on the ground
that there is a reasonable relationship between the construction of
commercial office space and the need for additional housing. It will be even
more difficult to demonstrate that connection when the exacted payments are
used for a variety of unknown neighborhood development projects.
Application of the Illinois specific and uniquely attributable test 13 6 to linkage
programs would exacerbate the difficulty.
VII
CONCLUSION

The reach of subdivision exactions has significantly expanded over the
years. What began as a means for preventing a subdivision from shifting to
the municipality the responsibility for installing public improvements has
been transmuted into a device by which municipalities are shifting to private
land developers the cost of facilities and social programs for the general
public that local government can no longer afford. 137 And what was originally
a method of guaranteeing installation of physical improvements prior to, or
contemporaneously with, the development of land has become a system for
accumulating a municipal kitty with which to construct public facilities in the
134. Draft Report, supra note 133, at 17.
135. Id. at 7.
136. See Pioneer Trust & Sav. Bank v. Village of Mount Prospect, 22 Il.2d 375, 380, 176 N.E.2d
799, 802 (1961); see supra text accompanying notes 49-51.
137. The ever broadening use of development exactions is not a strictly American phenomenon.
It has become a commonplace feature of applications for development permission under the British
Town and Country Planning Act, 1971, ch. 78. And there, as here, local governmental authorities
have frequently overstepped reasonably defensible boundaries.
[T]he town planningjustification for some of the more extreme examples of community benefits
such, for example, as the provision, or the financing, of municipal housing or community centres
which have no real connection with the development proposed or with the development site-is
not so clear. This is because, in the examples just quoted, the developer is being asked to
provide facilities which it is the local authority's statutory duty to provide themselves and, in
addition, because the scale of the community-benefit provision which is being required of the
developer is frequently assessed mainly, if not exclusively, by reference to the estimated
profitability of the completed scheme. Thus, in such cases, the local planning authority are [sic]
revealed as an authority more anxious to find themselves participating in the expected profits of
the development than an authority found to be applying appropriate planning policies to the
proposed development in a straightforward way.
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future. It is no longer the case that exaction requirements are imposed only
when direct benefit to the land and extra costs to government created by
development are demonstrable. Instead, exaction fees have approached what
the Colis court called "grand theft,"' 38 as the benefit to private landowners
has become marginal, or in some cases, nonexistent, and the public need
attributable to new development more tenuous and theoretical. 13 9
The decisions with respect to land development exactions have proceeded
step by step. No individual decision has represented a remarkable extension
of prior law. But few reviewing courts have looked further back than the most
recent precedent. Rarely, if ever, has a court stopped to reconsider
fundamental constitutional and equitable issues presented by the latest
innovation in exactions. If the leap from the most recent precedent is not too
great, the courts have been willing to make it. Thus, the law has developed,
albeit in relatively small increments, all the way from mandatory construction
of on-site physical improvements to compulsory linkage payments. Not even
the boldest partisan of the Ayres decision 140 could have foreseen such a
progression.
Heap & Ward, Planning Bargaining-The Pros and Cons: or, How Much Can the System Stand?, 1980 J.
PLAN. & ENV'T L. 631, 632, reprinted in Heap, The British Experience, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Winter
1987, at 31 app. A.
The debate in England prompted a study by the Department of the Environment of development
exactions. See PROPERTY ADVISORY GROUP, DEPARTMENT OF ENV'T, PLANNING GAIN (1981). The
Department of the Environment also published guidelines for local planning authorities to use in
imposing planning gain obligations on a development. DEP'T OF ENV'T, CIRCULAR No. 22/83 (1983),
reprinted in Heap, The British Experience, LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS., Winter 1987, at 31 app. B. The
Department defines "planning gain" as the imposition on a developer of "an obligation to carry out
works not included in the development for which permission has been sought or to make some
payment or confer some extraneous right or benefit in return for permitting development to take
place." Id. at para. 2. The guidelines permit the developer to impose planning gain obligations
when what is required:
(1) is needed to enable the development to go ahead, such as adequate access, water supply,
sewerage, drainage and so forth; or,
(2) in the case of financial payments, will contribute to the cost of providing such facilities in
the near future; or,
(3) is so directly related to the proposed development and to the use of the land after the
development is completed that the development ought not to be permitted without it, such as
providing off-street parking or reasonable amounts of open space; or,
(4) in the case of mixed development, is designed to secure an acceptable balance of uses.
(5) The extent of what is required must be fairly and reasonably related in scale and in kind to
the benefit which the proposed development will derive from the facilities to be provided.
(6) What the developer is asked to provide, or to finance, must be directly related to the
development in question or the use of land after development. As an example, the guidelines
indicate that normally it would not be reasonable to seek a contribution for road construction or
improvements in the immediate vicinity of a proposed development unless the need arises
wholly and substantially from the new development.
Id. at para. 6. For an excellent recent discussion of planning gain exactions in England, see Callies,
Developers Agreements and Planning Gain, 17 URB. LAw. 599 (1985).
138. Collis v. City of Bloomington, 310 Minn. 5, 17, 246 N.W.2d 19, 26 (1976).
139. See, e.g., Grupe v. California Coastal Comm'n, 166 Cal. App. 3d 148, 212 Cal. Rptr. 578
(1985). For a discussion of the Grope decision, see supra text accompanying note 46-48.
140. 34 Cal. 2d 31, 207 P.2d 1 (1949). For a discussion of the A.vres decision, see supra text
accompanying notes 16-17.
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It is time for local governments to realize that the exaction "party" is over.
The end is near, not because of the courts, but because of a changing
economy. In the post-World War II era, an abundance of cheap land, an
extraordinary demand for housing, and the consequent suburban sprawl
brought about an influx of housing into previously undeveloped or
underdeveloped suburbs that required the construction of substantial
amounts of physical infrastructure. The combination of low cost land, high
housing demand, and demonstrable public need made subdivision exactions
tolerable. Now, however, as the newer suburbs compete for glamorous
developments, age overtakes the older suburbs, urban neighborhoods
deteriorate and regentrify, and commerce abandons the central city for
landscaped office parks, the leverage of local government over development
will decrease. Rehabilitation and redevelopment of urban and older suburban
areas is unlikely to take place if it is burdened with exactions that represent a
disguised and nonuniform system of taxation. In sum, it is time to work
toward a consensus between the public and private sectors on which public
facility costs a private developer can reasonably be expected to bear.

